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Introduction 
 
 
“Negative Emissions”: 
A Challenge for Climate Policy 
Oliver Geden and Stefan Schäfer 
The objective of the Paris Agreement is to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees 
Celsius, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees. The Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) believes that these targets cannot be 
reached through conventional mitigation measures alone. The IPCC assumes that 
in addition to reducing emissions, technologies for removing greenhouse gases from 
the atmosphere will become indispensable. The preferred technology option combines 
increased use of bio-energy with the capture and storage of carbon dioxide. To date, 
climate policy has largely ignored the necessity for “negative emissions” to achieve 
the temperature targets set out in the Paris Agreement. Discussions on the underlying 
model assumptions, potentials and risks of imaginable technological options, as well 
as their political implications, are only just beginning. It would be wise for the EU and 
Germany to proactively shape this debate and increase funding for research and devel-
opment. If the Paris climate objectives are upheld, climate policy pioneers will soon be 
facing calls to set emission-reduction targets of much more than 100 percent – a notion 
that today seems paradoxical, but may soon become reality. 
 
Global climate stabilisation targets, such 
as restricting global warming to 1.5 or 2 
degrees Celsius (°C) above pre-industrial, 
are usually translated into carbon budgets 
that show the total amount of emissions 
that would still be allowed for meeting the 
target. According to current calculations, 
the remaining emissions budget for the 
2 °C target is about 800 gigatonnes (Gt) of 
carbon dioxide (CO2). However, for 1.5 °C, 
it is only about 200 Gt. Given that annual 
CO2 emissions currently stand at about 
40 Gt, the world’s budget for 2 °C would 
be consumed by the mid-2030s, the budget 
for 1.5 °C as soon as the early 2020s. Since 
completely decarbonising the world econo-
my within a time frame of only 5 to 20 years 
is unrealistic, climate models build on the 
concept of negative emissions. By using 
technologies to remove CO2 from the atmos-
phere, the original emissions budget could 
initially be overshot, with the resulting 
deficit then being recouped over the course 
of the 21st century. However, the looming 
budget deficit has now reached an alarm-
ing size. The IPCC’s climate models show 
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that a total of 500 to 800 Gt in negative 
emissions would have to be generated by 
2100 to limit global warming to 2 °C or 
1.5 °C – in other words, up to twenty times 
the current annual CO2 emissions. 
In principle, all governments accept the 
scientific consensus set out by the IPCC in 
its 5th Assessment Report (2013-2014). The 
report points out that negative emissions 
cannot be avoided if ambitious climate tar-
gets are to be met. Currently, however, there 
is hardly any discussion on how to bring 
about negative emissions. This is particularly 
worrying because building the necessary 
capacities would have to start by 2030 at 
the latest. Since there is no political debate 
on negative emissions yet, potential con-
flicts of interests or public acceptance prob-
lems can only be guessed at. The possible 
social and ecological consequences of such 
a far-reaching use of technologies for CO2 
removal have barely been examined. The 
biggest problem, however, is that almost 
all the technological options currently 
being favoured are still in the early stages 
of development, making their potential for 
successful deployment extremely uncer-
tain. 
Technological options 
In its current climate-economic models, the 
IPCC almost exclusively refers to a techno-
logical option that combines planting fast-
growing biomass, burning it in power sta-
tions to generate electricity, and capturing 
and storing the CO2 that is released in the 
process (bio-energy with carbon capture 
and storage – BECCS). During its growth 
phase, the biomass absorbs carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere that is then captured 
during combustion and subsequently 
stored, for instance in geological forma-
tions. This process would be constantly 
repeated with new biomass, thus reducing 
the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. 
So far, however, BECCS has barely been 
tested: there is only one single pilot facility 
in the US. Moreover, generating the amount 
of negative emissions that is assumed in 
climate-economic models would require an 
additional area for growing biomass that 
is equivalent to one-and-a-half to two times 
the surface area of India. Transporting the 
CO2 and storing it underground would also 
require enormous capacities. And yet the use 
of this technology is always already included 
in the calculations of climate researchers, 
environmental NGOs or policymakers when 
they insist that, based on the IPCC’s calcu-
lations, targets such as 2 °C or even 1.5 °C 
can still be met. 
Over half a dozen other technological 
options are also under discussion. They 
range from apparently unproblematic 
measures, such as afforestation, to fertilis-
ing or liming the oceans. On closer inspec-
tion, however, even a universally supported 
measure such as afforestation raises the ques-
tion of whether it can really help to limit 
global warming. Especially for the boreal 
forests of the northern hemisphere, the 
darkening of the Earth’s surface that would 
result from an afforestation of large regions, 
and the attending warming effect, might 
more than cancel out the cooling effect 
that would result from binding CO2 in trees 
– thus achieving the very opposite of the 
intended outcome. By contrast, suggestions 
for afforestation of the Sahara or Australian 
outback simply seem unrealistic. 
Fertilising the oceans is based on the idea 
that algae growth in some maritime regions 
is limited by a lack of nutrients, especially 
iron. A targeted addition of iron could pro-
voke algae growth, removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere: when the algae die and sink to 
the seabed, the CO2 stored in them would 
be permanently sequestered there. In 2009, 
the German-Indian iron-fertilisation experi-
ment LOHAFEX attracted international at-
tention to the idea of ocean iron fertilisa-
tion. From a climate-policy perspective, 
however, the results were disappointing. 
The algae growth primarily caused a local 
population of crustaceans to multiply. The 
amount of CO2 that was removed from the 
atmosphere was very small. 
Another possibility is liming the oceans. 
This involves adding calcium oxide powder 
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(lime) to sea water to increase its pH value. 
Since water that is more alkaline absorbs 
more CO2 from the air, this method could 
extract carbon dioxide from the atmos-
phere. At the same time, it could ease the 
acidification of the oceans. However, the 
effectiveness of this option is once again 
questionable: producing calcium oxide 
powder is a CO2-intensive process, and 
transporting it would also generate emis-
sions. 
New distributional conflicts 
In climate research, at least, the potentials 
and risks of the individual technological 
options are now beginning to be explored. 
By contrast, the political implications of a 
negative emissions climate policy have not 
yet been elucidated. The United Nations’ 
(UN) policy to protect the climate has so far 
relied on allotting differentiated levels of 
responsibility to individual groups of states 
that will converge in the long term – at the 
very latest when all states have reduced 
their emissions to zero. First, because of 
their historical responsibility and greater 
economic capability, the ‘old’ industrialised 
nations have to substantially reduce their 
emissions. Some of them, such as the north-
western member states of the EU, have 
claimed a pioneering status for themselves. 
Here, the so-called “zero line” – reducing 
emissions by 100 percent – has been the 
conceptual reference point. Some EU coun-
tries will reach the zero line earlier than 
others, but member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe will be obliged to follow 
suit. This is also true for large emerging 
economies like China and India. Convergence 
towards zero thus means a pioneering role 
for a limited period of time. The assump-
tion that such a role will bring positive 
economic effects rests not least on the idea 
that the countries initially lagging behind 
will have to follow suit eventually, and will 
do so using technologies developed by the 
pioneers. 
However, conceptually expanding the 
scope of mitigation policy by entering 
“negative territory” below the zero line – 
assuming, in other words, that emission 
reductions of more than 100 percent are 
possible and worthwhile – could perpetuate 
the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. Should the limit of what 
is currently conceivable in emissions miti-
gation be removed, new conflicts about 
burden sharing would be inevitable. Pos-
sibilities for differentiating national cli-
mate targets would greatly increase, and 
the pioneers would have to play their part 
for much longer. For the year 2100, the 
IPCC considers net negative emissions of 
around 10 Gt to be feasible. This would 
correspond to a global emissions-reduction 
target of around 125 percent against the 
base year 1990. If this became a point of 
reference in the UN climate negotiations, 
key emitters like China or India, and most 
of the developing countries would likely 
argue that the industrialised nations organ-
ised in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) should 
continue to take on more far-reaching 
responsibilities. For instance, emerging 
economies and developing countries could 
demand that OECD countries invest more 
in carbon-dioxide removal whilst they 
themselves might not even reduce their 
own emissions to zero. If the EU agrees to 
a reduction target of, say, 150 percent, we 
should also expect to see conflicts within 
the Union: the latecomers from Central 
and Eastern Europe will be keen to main-
tain the EU’s internal distribution of 
responsibilities. 
Similar conflicts should also be expected 
between different economic sectors. If BECCS 
becomes the world’s preferred carbon-
removal technology, the electricity sector 
would be the very first to be called upon to 
generate negative emissions. The sector is 
already the focal point of emissions- mitiga-
tion efforts and is likely to reach the zero 
line long before the transport or buildings 
sector. 
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A necessary strategic decision 
Following the IPCC’s calculations, carbon 
removal technologies will have to be 
deployed extensively if ambitious global 
climate targets are to be met. This does 
not mean that climate policy is obliged to 
go down this path, let alone to the extent 
discussed above. One could still decide 
against it. However, under the strictly cal-
culative logic of carbon budgets, this would 
have consequences for the attainability of 
global climate targets. Without negative 
emissions, the 1.5 °C target would be out 
of reach, and the 2 °C target could only be 
met at far greater cost, if at all. 
If climate policy pioneers like the EU 
and Germany do not want to prematurely 
abandon the temperature targets decided 
in Paris, they will have to start developing 
strategies for CO2 removal soon. Global 
emissions budgets for 1.5 °C and 2 °C will 
be consumed within five to 20 years. This 
means that the reduction corridor of 80 
to 95 percent by 2050, which is valid for 
Germany and the EU, can only be an ad-
equate contribution to meeting global tem-
perature targets if emissions in the second 
half of the century are pushed substantially 
below the zero line. To date, neither the EU 
nor Germany has declared itself ready to 
aim for long-term reduction targets of more 
than 100 percent. And even if they did, it 
remains unclear whether such a policy 
would be technologically and economically 
feasible, and if it would find sufficient 
socio-political support. 
In principle, a negative-emissions strategy 
can only be realised if climate, energy and 
research policy rapidly set the process in 
motion. Not only would it be necessary to 
invest substantially in research and devel-
opment, but also to start a broad political 
and societal debate, and initiate regulatory 
considerations. In many respects, these con-
siderations concern challenges that also 
had to be solved (or still remain to be solved) 
in deploying conventional emissions-miti-
gation technologies. For example, precise 
accounting rules for negative emissions 
need to be set out, undesired side effects 
need to be avoided, and specific incentive 
schemes for using CO2 removal technolo-
gies have to be created. It would seem logi-
cal to clarify these points as part of the 
existing regulatory framework, such as the 
EU emissions trading directive or the EU’s 
sustainability criteria for biomass. 
Politically, the most sensitive issues in 
any potential German strategy for negative 
emissions are linked to the fundamental 
decisions that have already been taken on 
Germany’s energy transition. Would Ger-
many be prepared to rethink its energy 
transition planning for the electricity sec-
tor if BECCS emerged as the technology 
with the greatest potential at the global 
level? Would the federal government be 
willing to change course drastically on bio-
mass and on carbon capture and storage, 
even at the expense of the decentralised ex-
pansion of wind and solar power? Or would 
it primarily encourage measures whose de-
ployment would barely impact on the struc-
ture of the national energy system, such as 
liming the oceans? 
There is still time for a broad discussion 
on the unconventional forms that an ambi-
tious climate protection policy might take, 
and for pursuing the corresponding techno-
logical options. The longer it takes to open 
such a debate, the greater is the risk that the 
Paris climate targets will slip out of reach. 
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